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A Market-Based Mechanism for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Emissions from shipping are a significant driver of human-induced climate change.
International action to date has not succeeded in setting those emissions on a sustainable trajectory.
The International Maritime Organization has committed to implementing an effective, international
approach to tackle international shipping’s contribution to climate change.
This paper considers international law principles, exploring whether and how these
principles may provide a basis for the IMO to address those contributions. The polluter pays
principle, which counsels that whoever produces pollution should cover the costs their pollution
imposes on others, is a doctrine of international law that offers strong support for the IMO to adopt
a market-based mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Other principles of international
law provide that any market-based mechanism the IMO adopts should be consistent with
international climate agreements, responsive to the different contributions that nations and
companies have made to the climate problem, built on the best available science while resolving any
uncertainties in favor of less risk to the environment, and respectful of universally-recognized
rights—both individual and national—to equity, life, and fair treatment.
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A Market-Based Mechanism for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping

INTRODUCTION
Emissions from shipping comprise nearly 3% of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG)
released worldwide and those emissions are currently on track to increase.1 But shipping was not
explicitly addressed in the Paris Agreement, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO or
the “Organization”) has only taken early steps toward reducing international shipping’s climate
impact. The IMO has committed to adopting a comprehensive scheme to reduce international
shipping emissions and raised the possibility of using a market-based mechanism (MBM). In order
to clarify how the IMO can take further steps, this white paper discusses the principles of
international law that establish and frame the Organization’s authority to adopt an MBM to reduce
GHG emissions. We consider nine of the most salient international law principles and explore
whether and how these principles may provide a basis for the IMO to act, and to allocate some of
the revenue generated by an MBM to small-island developing nations (SIDs) and other states
particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts.
As discussed below, the IMO’s authority to adopt an MBM on GHG emissions from shipping
is grounded in a number of international law principles. The polluter pays principle offers the
strongest support for imposing costs specifically on private entities such as shipping companies.
Other principles provide a general basis for the IMO to rapidly decrease greenhouse gases from the
shipping sector, and establish some parameters on what kind of measures the IMO can adopt.

IMO’S GENERAL AUTHORITY
The IMO’s broad objectives give it authority to adopt a wide range of potential MBMs
to reduced GHG emissions from ships.

2

Article 1 of the IMO Convention describes the

Organization’s purpose as, among others, to “facilitate the general adoption of the highest
practicable standards in matters concerning . . . prevention and control of marine pollution from
Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm. [MEPC], Fourth IMO GHG Study 2020 Annex 1, 3–4, MEPC Doc.
75/7/15 (July 20, 2020), https://docs.imo.org/Shared/Download.aspx?did=125134 [hereinafter Fourth
IMO GHG Study].
2 MBMs are the sole focus of this paper. But as further explained below, the IMO’s authority is broad
enough to cover a wide range of potential measures.
1
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ships.”3 Article 2, which lays out the Organization’s functions, places no substantive limitation on
the types of measures it can undertake within a broad charge to “[p]rovide for the drafting of
conventions, agreements, or other suitable instruments, and recommend these to Governments and
to intergovernmental organizations, and convene such conferences as may be necessary.”4
The 1973/1978 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) governs pollution from the shipping sector. 5 A subsidiary body of the IMO, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), is broadly tasked with performing functions “for the
prevention and control of marine pollution from ships, particularly with respect to the adoption and
amendment of regulations or other provisions.”6 These include adopting and amending MARPOL’s
annexes, which address different types of pollution.7
In 2003 the IMO adopted a resolution setting out policies and priorities for reducing GHG
emissions from ships.8 Among other items, the IMO directed the MEPC to prioritize its consideration
of market-based solutions.9 In 2009 the MEPC considered a range of proposals, and while it did not
adopt any, the committee “agreed by overwhelming majority that a market-based measured was
needed as part of a comprehensive package of measures for the regulation [of] GHG emissions from
international shipping.”10 A market-based measure is an instrument that:

Convention on the International Maritime Consultative Organization, art. 1(a), March 6, 1948 289
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter, as subsequently amended by IMO resolutions, “IMO Convention].
4 Id. at art. 2(b).
5 See PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 403 (3d ed. Oxford
University Press 2009); see also International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(as amended by Protocol of 1978), Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter “MARPOL”].
6 IMO Convention, art. 38(a).
7 BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 5.
8 Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], A. 963 (23), IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships (Mar. 4, 2004), https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/
KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyDocuments/A.963(23).pdf.
9 Id. ¶ 1(d).
10 Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm. [MEPC], Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its
Fifty-Ninth Session ¶ 4.106, MEPC Doc. 59/24 (July 27, 2009), https://docs.imo.org/Shared/
Download.aspx?did=56200.
3
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seek[s] to address the market failure of “environmental externalities” either by
incorporating the external cost of production or consumption activities through taxes
or charges on processes or products, or by creating property rights and facilitating
the establishment of a proxy market for the use of environmental services.11
Since 2009, a wide range of measures have been proposed but so far not adopted. 12
The sections that follow address principles of international law that bear on the IMO’s
authority to adopt an MBM to reduce GHGs. 13 But first we say a word about the procedures
necessary to adopt an MBM. The IMO’s governing instruments provide for a vote on whether to
adopt such a measure,14 but in practice the Organization typically seeks consensus before acting.15 It
is well recognized that searching for consensus can slow the IMO’s decision making process, but the
practice persists because of its perceived benefits—among others, increased acceptance of
consensus-backed decisions and avoiding the divisiveness of a vote. 16 But halting action until
consensus is reached can result in deadlock, and there is precedent for the IMO to use its voting

KOEN RADEMAEKERS ET AL., THE ROLE OF MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS IN ACHIEVING A RESOURCE
EFFICIENT ECONOMY ¶ 1.2.1 (2011),
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/mbi/pdf/studies/role_marketbased.pdf (quoting
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BUSINESS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: POLICY INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE RESPONSES (2007)).
12 Market-Based Measures, IMO, https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/MarketBased-Measures.aspx; see also Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm. [MEPC], Report of the Marine Environment
Protection Committee on Its Seventy-Fifth Session ¶ 7.28, MEPC Doc. 75/18 (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://docs.imo.org/Shared/Download.aspx?did=126835 (approving draft amendments to
MARPOL setting out technical and operational measures to reduce shipping’s carbon intensity, but
not market-based measures).
13 See Aoife O’Leary & Jennifer Brown, The Legal Bases for IMO Climate Measures (Sabin Center
Working Paper, 2018), https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/OLearyand-Brown-2018-06-IMO-Climate-Measures.pdf.
14 See, e.g., IMO Convention art. 62.
15 See O’Leary & Brown, supra note 13 at (noting that “in practice the IMO rarely calls for a vote and
usually proceeds by consensus”); Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Christos A. Kontovas, Influence and
transparency at the IMO: the name of the game, 22 MARITIME ECON. & LOGISTICS 151, 152 (2020) (“[A]s
is common practice among UN bodies, the IMO operates on a consensus basis . . . .”).
16 See id.
11
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mechanisms where members cannot reach unanimity on a proposed measure.17 So the IMO could,
even if some members object, proceed with an MBM that receives a majority vote but not unanimous
support.18 Such a measure could be enforced through a combination of flag state and port state
controls, as the IMO required for its recent measure limiting the sulfur content of fuels.19

1.

POLLUTER PAYS

The polluter pays principle is a framework for addressing the problem of externalities. An
externality is the impact of a transaction on third parties that do not participate in the transaction—
or, more generally, the impact of economic activity on society in general. Perhaps the paradigmatic
example is pollution in a river caused by the normal operations of a factory. The question arises of
who bears the burden of this pollution: the company that owns the factory, which receives the
economic benefits; the consumers, who receive the benefit of consuming the company’s products;
downstream neighbors; or society in general. Without intervention, the burden will fall on
downstream neighbors. The polluter pays principle teaches that the company should bear the cost
of the pollution, which might then be passed on to consumers who drive demand for the company’s
product as the cost is internalized into the product’s price.20

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES OF ICAO AND IMO IN RESPECT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS at 14 (2016),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/595332/IPOL_STU(2016)595332_EN.
pdf (“A consequence of the search for unanimity is deadlocks in some areas, in particular the
application of market-based mechanisms to reduce CO2 emissions from ships.”) (citation omitted);
see also Psaraftis & Kontovas, supra note 15 at 152 (“[W]ith respect to EEDI/SEEMP, it was
impossible to achieve consensus, and the measures were adopted by vote in spite of fierce
resistance by a group of developing countries, including China, India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia.”).
18 For a detailed discussion of the specific processes by which the IMO could take this step, see
O’Leary & Brown, supra note 13 at 9–19.
19 See Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm. [MEPC] Resolution 321 (74), 2019 Guidelines for Port State Control
Under MARPOL Annex VI Chapter 3 (May 17, 2019), https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/
OurWork/Environment/Documents/MEPC.321%2874%29.pdf.
20 See PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY & JORGE E. VIÑUALES, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 81-82 (2d
ed. Cambridge University Press, 2018).
17
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An early recognition of polluter pays as a legal principle appears in a 1972 recommendation
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Council.

The

21

recommendation stated:
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control
measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid
distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called “Polluter-Pays
Principle.” This principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of
carrying out the [environmental] measures decided by public authorities to ensure
that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these
measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and services that cause pollution in
production and/or consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied by
subsidies that would create significant distortions in international trade and
investment.22
In 1973 the OECD also issued a Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle,
explaining that under the principle, “the polluter should bear the expenses of preventing and
controlling pollution ‘to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state,’” which will be
determined by public authorities. “In fact, the Polluter-Pays Principle is no more than an efficiency
principle for allocating costs and does not involve bringing pollution down to an optimum level of
any type, although it does not exclude the possibility of doing so.”23
The principle was later enshrined in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (Rio Declaration). The Rio Declaration came out of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, also known as the “Earth Summit” or the “Rio Conference,” held
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992.24 The Rio Declaration consists of a short preamble followed
by twenty-seven principles for sustainable development. Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration
provides:

Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the
Polluter Pays Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 468 (2000).
22 OECD, Environment and Economics: Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic
Aspects of Environmental Policies, May 26, 1972, annex para. 1 Doc. No. C(72)128, 1972 WL 24710.
23 Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Env't Committee (1973).
24 See DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 20 at 13–14.
21
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National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due
regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment.25
Polluter pays has been influential in holding polluters accountable and internalizing the costs
of pollution,26 and has been embraced in international tribunals. For example, the Court of Justice of
the European Union has described polluter pays as a “principle of environmental law” and held that
the principle justifies requiring airlines to surrender emissions allowances at a variable rate based
on miles traveled.27 In a case concerning nuclear weapons, a judge of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) similarly noted that “the ‘polluter pays principle’ [places] on the author of
environmental damage the burden of making adequate reparation to those affected.”28

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc A/Conf.151/26 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874,
876 (1992) [hereinafter “Rio Declaration”].
26 Armin Rosencraz et al., The Evolution and Influence of International Environmental Norms, 49 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10125, 10129 (2019); DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 517 (3d ed. Foundation Press, 2007).
27 Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate Change,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:864, ¶ 153 (Dec. 21, 2011) (“[A] particular airline may be required, when departing
from or arriving at a European aerodrome, to surrender emission allowances that are higher the
further the point of departure is from the destination. Taking account of the whole length of the
flight is ultimately an expression of the principle of proportionality and reflects the ‘polluter pays’
principle of environmental law.”); see also Suzanne Kingston, The Polluter Pays Principle in EU
Climate Law: An Effective Tool Before the Courts? 22 (UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology &
Socio-Legal Studies, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3671375 (“The PPP forms an essential part of
the constitutional framework for EU environmental policy and, as soft law hardens into legislation
and binding targets, judges will be required to answer difficult questions about its implications.”)
28 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Weeramantry, J.
1996 I.C.J. 503 (July 8); see also Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area
(Nicar. v. Costa Rica) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v.
Costa Rica), Separate Opinion of Bhandari, J., 2015 I.C.J. 796 (Dec 16) (noting that the polluter pays
principle “does not have the status of a principle of general international law” but that it “acts as
merely a general guideline of public international law.”) (citations omitted).
25
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The IMO has recognized the “‘polluter pays’ principle as a general principle of international
environmental law.”29 A number of IMO conventions incorporate the polluter pays principle. For
example, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution was adopted to ensure
compensation to persons who suffer oil pollution damage resulting from maritime casualties
involving oil-carrying ships, and places liability for damage on the owner of the ship from which oil
escaped or was discharged. 30 The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil
Pollution Damage similarly holds ship owners liable for pollution damage caused by any bunker oil
on board or originating from its ship, and seeks to ensure adequate and effective compensation for
such damage.31
There are several advantages to relying on the polluter pays principle for adopting an MBM
to reduce GHG emissions from shipping. One is that, as discussed, it is widely accepted, including
by the IMO. Additionally, polluter pays allows the assignment of responsibility to individuals or
companies rather than states.32 Even if the IMO’s mechanism is ultimately implemented by states—
for example, if states allocate allowances among regulated entities—the objective is for shipping
companies, rather than governments, to bear the costs.
Moreover, the polluter pays principle is suitable to the problem of climate change because it
is not confined to scenarios in which one company emits a conventional pollutant that causes harm
to one victim. Rather, the principle can be incorporated into an MBM to address pollution that harms
the general environment. This applies to cases of “aggregate pollution loading,” in which multiple
polluters are responsible and it is difficult to identify particular victims; the government then serves
as a proxy for the victimized society. In such circumstances, the polluter pays principle counsels that
each polluter should internalize the costs of pollution by reimbursing the government for the

International Maritime Organization: International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Co-Operation, 1990, and Final Act of the Conference, Nov. 30, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733,
736 (1991).
30 See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,
973 U.N.T.S. 3.
31 See Adoption of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage,
Agenda Item 8, 27 December 2015, LEG/CONF.12/19.
32 See DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 20 at 82.
29
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expense of addressing the problem.33 Here, the IMO stands in for the government, and can require
shipping companies to internalize the costs of greenhouse gas emissions by levying a carbon tax.
Indeed, the polluter pays principle arguably provides the basis for the Carbon Offsetting and
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). CORSIA is the carbon pricing scheme that
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted in 2016 to stabilize emissions from
aircraft, following the Kyoto Protocol’s delegation of authority to ICAO to address greenhouse gases
from the aviation sector.34 Arguably, the IMO has even more authority than ICAO to implement
such an MBM. As discussed, the IMO has express authority to adopt measures to address “marine
pollution,” whereas ICAO adopted measures to deal with aviation greenhouse gas emissions under
the umbrella of regulating safety and efficiency of air navigation.35
For these reasons, the polluter pays principle provides strong support to the IMO’s authority
to adopt a market-based mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from shipping.

2.
PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT
PRINCIPLE OF HIGHEST AMBITION
The Principle of Highest Ambition comes from the Paris Agreement, an international accord
to implement the goals of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). 36 The parties to the Paris Agreement seek to hold the increase in global average
temperatures to well below two degrees Celsius, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature rise
to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels.37 Parties are required to periodically submit nationally
determined contributions (NDCs) stating the GHG emissions reductions that they plan to contribute
to these overarching goals.38 Article 4(3) of the Paris Agreement states:

See Nash, supra note 21, at 478.
See generally Thomas Leclerc, A Sectoral Application of the Polluter Pays Principle: Lessons Learned
from the Aviation Sector, 9 CLIMATE LAW 303–25 (2019).
35 See O’Leary & Brown, supra note 13, at 8 (discussing comparison between ICAO’s CORSIA
system and a potential MBM under IMO Convention).
36 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, 12 December 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/L.1, art.
4(3) [hereinafter “Paris Agreement”].
37 Id. art. 2(1)(a).
38 Id. art. 4.
33
34
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Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a
progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and
reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national
circumstances.39
The Paris Agreement thus heightens the urgency of the global task to reduce emissions from all
sectors.40 Some see the principle of highest ambition as assigning states a duty of care, taking into
account their respective common but differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances
(discussed infra).41 Because the principle of highest ambition holds states to a stringent standard of
emissions reduction, it provides a basis for the IMO to seek steep cuts in shipping emissions and
fulfill its goal of achieving reductions consistent with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement.
Although the principle of highest ambition is not expressly mentioned in MARPOL or the
IMO Convention, the IMO Convention does instruct the Organization to “encourage the general
adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety and efficiency
of navigation.”42 This provision is arguably akin to the principle of highest ambition, particularly
given that climate disruption threatens maritime safety (through more extreme storms, damage to
port infrastructure, and other factors) and efficiency is a primary means of reducing shipping GHGs.
Moreover, the IMO Initial GHG Strategy references the Paris Agreement temperature goals. 43 The
IMO Initial GHG Strategy also explicitly aims to enhance the IMO’s contribution to global efforts
including the Paris Agreement.44 Furthermore, “[t]he Paris Agreement is a temperature-based target
and therefore implies inclusion of all emissions that affect climate.” 45 If shipping emissions are

Id. art. 4(3).
See O’Leary & Brown, supra note 13 at 4.
41 Christina Voigt & Felipe Ferreira, ‘Dynamic differentiation’: The Principles of CBDRRC-RC,
Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. LAW 297
(2016).
42 IMO Convention, Pt. 1, art. 1(a).
43 Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm. [MEPC], Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from
Ships, MEPC Res. 304(72) (Apr. 13, 2018) [hereinafter IMO Initial GHG Strategy],
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/MEPCDoc
uments/MEPC.304(72).pdf.
44 Id.
45 DAVID S. LEE, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT TEMPERATURE GOALS 1 (Dec.
2018) (commissioned by the UK Department for Transport).
39
40
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permitted to rise unchecked, they could seriously interfere with the achievement of the Paris
temperature targets. In fact, the IMO has determined that GHG emissions from international
shipping could grow by 90-130% by 2050. 46 The principle of highest ambition thus creates an
imperative to address GHG emissions from the shipping sector, consistent with the objectives of the
Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC.

3.

COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES AND
RESPECTIVE CAPABILITIES
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities

(CBDRRC), in the light of the different national circumstances, provides that developed and
developing countries may have different levels of responsibility to respond to international
environmental problems, though all have some responsibility. The principle aims to distribute the
effort required to manage environmental problems of a global nature among states on the basis of
two criteria: responsibilities and capabilities. Responsibilities include both historical and present
responsibilities, and capabilities include both financial and technical. Put differently, the principle
of CBDRRC recognizes that some states have contributed more to certain environmental problems,
and that some states have greater capacity to address those problems, and seeks to allocate
responsibility based on those respective contributions and capacities.47
Some commenters view CBDRRC as the flipside of the concept that certain environmental
processes or protective actions raise common concerns, triggering obligations on all states and the
need for international cooperation. CBDRRC purports to moderate the common obligations of all
states by taking a more nuanced approach to cooperation that recognizes inequalities between
developed and developing states.48
The concept of common but differentiated responsibilities first appeared in the 1985 Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which refers to the “circumstances and particular

Fourth IMO GHG Study, supra note 1 at 12.
See DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 20 at 83 (citing Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer preamble ¶ 5, March 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293. [hereinafter “Vienna Convention”]).
48 DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 51–52 (Oxford University
Press 2017).
46
47
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requirements of developing countries.”49 The Vienna Convention also requires countries to fulfill
their obligations “in accordance with the means at their disposal and their capabilities” and
cooperate with respect to technology transfer. 50 The Rio Declaration formalized the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities, stating that:
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore
the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions
to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures
their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial
resources they command.51
While not yet formally embraced as customary international law,52 the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities has since been incorporated into a number of international legal
instruments. The principle was formulated in the climate regime with the additional concept of
respective capabilities, resulting in CBDRRC. Article 3 of the UNFCCC provides:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly,
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects thereof.53
The UNFCCC expands on the conception of CBDRRC espoused in the Rio Declaration.
Whereas the Rio Declaration focuses on countries’ disparate contributions to environmental
degradation, the UNFCCC also recognizes the unequal capabilities between developed and
developing countries. The differentiation as envisioned by the UNFCCC is thus a function not only
of countries’ different emissions levels, but also their distinct capacities to address climate change.
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC gave effect to this principle by requiring developed countries to
meet quantified emissions targets and imposing no such obligations on developing countries.54
Id. at 84–85 (quoting Vienna Convention, preamble ¶ 5).
Id. at 85 (quoting Vienna Convention, arts. 2(2), 4(2)).
51 See Rio Declaration, Principle 7; see also ROGER R. MARTELLA, JR. & BRETT BROSKO,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 979 (American Bar Association 2014).
52 BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 48 at 52.
53 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(1), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107 [hereinafter “UNFCCC”].
54 Kyoto Protocol at art. 3(1).
49
50

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3807378

11

A Market-Based Mechanism for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping

While the Paris Agreement recognizes the principle of CBDRRC, it does not actually
implement the principle with respect to states’ emissions reductions commitments. 55 The Paris
Agreement uses a lighter touch by not imposing specific emissions reduction obligations on states,
but instead calling on each country to put forward emission reduction pledges, and urging the
developed countries and others to provide financial assistance to developing countries in
recognition of the latter’s relatively limited capacities.56 However, “[t]he principle of CBDRRC . . .
guides the further normative development of the climate regime, notwithstanding ongoing
contestations over the correct interpretation of the principle and its future,” and differentiation has,
for example, been incorporated into the ICAO MBM for reducing emissions from international
aviation.57
Some IMO documents have recognized and incorporated CBDRRC. For example, the
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters—
known as the London Convention—requires contracting parties to “take effective measures,
according to their scientific, technical and economic capabilities, to prevent, reduce and where
practicable eliminate pollution.”58 During the developments of the 2011 Annex VI amendments to
MARPOL, which apply to air pollution from ships, some states argued that CBDRRC should apply
to differentiate the limits on maritime pollution for developed and developing countries. However,
developed countries argued that CBDRRC conflicts with the principle of nondiscrimination
(discussed infra), and that the latter should control. The IMO secretariat took the position that the
two principles do not conflict, because CBDRRC applies to countries while nondiscrimination
applies to ships. Developed countries ultimately prevailed; the amendments apply equally to all
vessels, although developing nations were able to waive them for four years. 59 The IMO

Paris Agreement, preamble, arts. 2(2), 4(4); see also BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 48 at 221.
See DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 20 at 85; Paris Agreement, art. 2(1)(c).
57 Beatriz Martinez Romera and Harro van Asselt, The International Regulation of Aviation Emissions,
27 JOURNAL OF ENVT’L LAW 271, 282 (July 2015).
58 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
1972, art. 2, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/
Documents/LC1972.pdf [hereinafter “London Convention”].
59 BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 48 at 269.
55
56
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subsequently adopted a resolution on technology transfer and capacity building for energy
efficiency in part to address this issue.60
Most relevant to the issue at hand, the IMO’s GHG Initial Strategy explicitly recognizes the
need to “be cognizant of the principles enshrined in instruments already developed, such as . . . the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of
different national circumstances.”61 CBDRRC also counsels that countries that have contributed the
most to climate change have greater responsibility. 62
CBDRRC is widely recognized in international law, and although it has not always prevailed
at the IMO, it is expressly incorporated into the IMO’s Initial GHG Strategy. 63 While the principle
might not specifically provide the authority to adopt an MBM, the concept of CBDRRC can shape the
way in which an MBM is operationalized. For example, some have argued that a carbon-pricing
scheme to reduce international shipping emissions should include a fund that allocates money to
developing countries in order to respect CBDRRC. 64 The principle thus justifies allocating the
revenue from any market-based mechanism to vulnerable nations in recognition of their relatively
limited capacity to address the problem of climate change and their national circumstances; and—
to the extent feasible within the IMO’s frameworks—requiring greater action on the part of countries
that have contributed the most to global greenhouse gas emissions.

MEPC, Promotion of Technical Cooperation and Transfer of Technology Relating to the Improvement of
Energy Efficiency of Ships, Annex 4, MEPC Doc. 65/22 (May 17, 2013), https://bit.ly/37SH6Vt.
61 IMO Initial GHG Strategy, supra note 43 ¶¶ 3.2.1.1 – .2.
62 It is worth noting that “making a definitive association between a particular ship and a particular
country for the purposes of CBDR-RC is complicated because a ship’s flag; the routes it sails on;
where it refuels; and the registration or nationality of the ships’ owners, charterers, and ship
financers are not necessarily related.” NEW CLIMATE INSTITUTE, AKI KACHI, SILKE MOOLDIJK,
CARSTEN WARNECKE, CARBON PRICING OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MARITIME EMISSIONS 25
(March 2019).
63 Some have argued that the IMO must expressly incorporate CBDRRC into its rule. See, e.g., Stathis
N. Palassis, The IMO’s Climate Change Challenge: Application of the Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities, 6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 160, 190 (2014).
64 See, e.g., NEW CLIMATE INSTITUTE, supra note 62 at 25.
60
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4.

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

The notion of precaution provides that the lack of scientific uncertainty about the actual or
potential effects of an activity must not prevent states from taking appropriate measures when such
effects may be serious or irreversible.65 It is enshrined in the Rio Declaration, which provides:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.66
The principle has been incorporated into the UNFCCC67 and other multilateral treaties,68 and
recognized by at least one international court.69
In the specific context of IMO resolutions, the precautionary principle is discussed in
juxtaposition with the need for evidence-based decision making. The IMO Convention provides, in
Article 1, that the IMO should “provide machinery . . . to encourage and facilitate the general
adoption of the highest practicable standards in . . . prevention and control of marine pollution from
ships.”70 Moreover, in its most recent strategic plan, the IMO reiterates that the mission of the agency
is, in part, to promote “environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping . . . by adopting
the highest practicable standards of . . . prevention and control of pollution from ships.”71

DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 20 at 70.
Rio Declaration, Principle 15.
67 UNFCCC art. 3(3).
68 See, e.g., Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 6, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88
(calling for a “precautionary approach”); Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biodiversity arts. 1 and 10(6), Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (same).
69 Tatar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, ¶ 120 (July 6, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00190981 (recognizing the importance of the precautionary principle).
70 IMO Convention art. 1(a).
71 Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO] A. 1110 (30), Six Year Strategic Plan for 2018–2023 (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyD
ocuments/A.1110(30).pdf; see also Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm. [MEPC], Comments on the Fourth IMO
GHG Study 2020 and Encouraging Further Ambitious Action to Reduce GHG Emissions Submitted by the
Marshall Islands and Solomon Islands ¶ 2, MEPC Doc. 75/7/17 (Sept. 25, 2020), https://docs.imo.org/
Shared/Download.aspx?did=125766 (noting without citation that “[d]ecisions in IMO must be
taken in light of the best available science”).
65
66
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A resolution titled “Guidelines on Incorporation of the Precautionary Approach in the
Context of Specific IMO Activities” caveats the IMO’s application of the precautionary principle
with the need to wait to act until there is a “compelling need.” There, the MEPC explains that:
if a precautionary approach is to be routinely incorporated into the work of IMO [it]
should ensure:
1. anticipation and prevention of environmental problems arising from any
regulatory activities of IMO and striving for continual improvement in all
facets of those activities;
2. that solutions to problems and consideration of new and existing policies,
programmes, guidelines and regulations are developed in accordance with
the precautionary approach;
3. that, where action is necessary and options may involve uncertainty, all
options are evaluated consistent with the precautionary approach;
....
8. consideration and adoption of economic incentives to encourage
environmental responsibility so as to conserve the marine environment and
avoid its further degradation[.]72
Immediately following its detailed explanation of what the precautionary approach requires,
the MEPC adds that “[t]he precautionary approach should not be considered in isolation of other
IMO practices, procedures and resolutions, including resolutions A.500 and A.777 and principles
such as the ‘polluter pays’ principle.” 73 Each of the Assembly resolutions the MEPC cites here
requires “the Council and the Committees [to] entertain proposals for new conventions or
amendments to existing conventions only on the basis of clear and well documented demonstration
of compelling need . . . and having regard to the costs . . . and the burden on the legislative and

Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm. [MEPC] Resolution 67 (37), Guidelines on Incorporation of the
Precautionary Approach in the Context of Specific IMO Activities ¶ 4 (Sept. 15, 1995),
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/MEPCDoc
uments/MEPC.67(37).pdf.
73 Id.
72
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administrative resources of Member States.”74 Although these guidelines are now over twenty-five
years old and arguably in tension with the Organization’s mission to encourage the highest
practicable standard for reducing pollution from ships, the MEPC’s 2018 initial strategy for GHG
reductions explicitly cites these guidelines. The strategy reiterates that the IMO’s GHG reductions
strategy should be guided by, among others, “the need for evidence-based decision-making
balanced with the precautionary approach as set out in [the resolution discussed above].”75
The precautionary principle is included in the Initial Strategy to make it possible for the IMO
to act even without complete data. But because IMO practice limits the use of the precautionary
principle by noting that it will not be considered apart from other principles, precaution is likely not
the strongest basis on which to base the IMO’s authority to act. However, the precautionary principle
does not merely justify intervention to prevent pollution. It can also provide a framework for that
intervention by heightening the standard of due diligence required in the face of environmental
harms that might be serious or irreversible. 76 Arguably, this is the most appropriate role for the
precautionary principle in the climate change context, given that no real uncertainty exists as to
whether greenhouse gases are harmful or cause serious and potentially irreversible impacts. In this
case, the principle can therefore play a role in setting the price of carbon within the MBM that is
Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], A. 500 (12), Objectives of the Organization in the 1980s ¶ 3 (Jan. 8, 1992),
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyD
ocuments/A.500(12).pdf; see also Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], A. 777 (18), Work Methods and
Organization of Work in Committees and Their Subsidiary Bodies ¶ 4 (Nov. 4, 1993),
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyD
ocuments/A.777(18).pdf (inviting “the attention of the Committees to resolution A.500(XII) and in
particular its recommendation that proposals for new conventions or amendments to existing
conventions be entertained only on the basis of clear and well-documented compelling need”); see
also Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Doc. BMW/CONF/36, International Convention for the Control and
Management of Ship’s Ballast preamble (Feb. 16, 2004), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
No%20Volume/55544/Part/I-55544-080000028053b465.pdf; Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Res. LDC 44
(14), The Application of a Precautionary Approach in Environmental Protection Within the Framework of
the London Dumping Convention ¶ 1 (Dec. 30, 1991), https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/
KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/LCLPDocuments/LDC.44(14).pdf. Moreover, the IMO’s
identification of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas is arguably based on the precautionary principle.
See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], A. 500 (12), A. 982 (24), Revised Guidelines for the Identification and
Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (Feb. 6, 2006), https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/
en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/A24-Res.982.pdf.
75 IMO Initial GHG Strategy, supra note 43.
76 See BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 48 at 53.
74
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adopted, as the IMO must seek to achieve emissions reductions that will contribute to averting
serious and irreversible harms.

5.

TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION AND THE NO-HARM
PRINCIPLE

The treatment of transboundary pollution evolved from the no-harm rule, a foundational
background principle of international law. The no-harm rule provides that states’ sovereign right to
use their territories and resources is constrained by their obligation to avoid doing serious harm
outside of their boundaries.77
The Trail Smelter case is the first international case to apply this principle to transboundary
air pollution. The case arose after sulfur dioxide emission from a zinc and lead smelter in British
Columbia damaged private agricultural forest properties in the U.S. State of Washington. The U.S.
and Canadian governments referred the case to the International Joint Commission. In 1931, the
Commission found that the smelter had caused property damage and awarded $350,000. The
Canadian government accepted liability, but the U.S. Government rejected the award, seeking to
have the Trail Smelter enjoined from operating. Arbitration continued, and in 1941 an ad hoc tribunal
concluded that not only could Canada be held liable for the damage, but that the nation could also
be compelled to force the Trail Smelter to close. The tribunal found:
under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United States,
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.78
The decision’s principles are now reflected throughout international law. 79 The no-harm
rule’s application to environmental damage has since been recognized in a number of international
legal instruments and cases.

See BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 48 at 40.
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 26 at 543–46 (quoting United States v. Canada, Arbitral Tribunal,
1941, 3 UN Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards (1941)).
79 MARTELLA & BROSKO, supra note 51 at 62.
77
78
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The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, the first multilateral statement
of international environmental law principles, is considered to mark the beginning of international
environmental law.80 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration—described as “the cornerstone of
international environmental law”81—provides as follows:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.82
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration contains almost identical language, but incorporates the
right to economic development by referring to states’ “own environmental and developmental
policies.”83
The ICJ affirmed in 1996 that “the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.”84 The ICJ clarified
in 2010 that this principle is customary international law.85
Moreover, it is also now commonly accepted that the no-harm rule applies beyond injuries
that one state can inflict on another. In 1970 the ICJ concluded that states have “certain obligations
towards the international community as a whole,” otherwise known as the ergo omnes, a concept that
has become widely recognized.86 The ICJ has repeatedly confirmed that, in general, the no-harm rule
applies to environmental impacts.87 Moreover, as discussed, the no-harm principle as articulated in

MARTELLA & BROSKO, supra note 51 at 978.
MARTELLA & BROSKO, supra note 51 at 978 (quoting PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 191 (3d ed. 2012)).
82 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/Conf. 48/14/Rev., 11 ILM 1416
(1972), Principle 21 (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Stockholm Declaration”].
83 Rio Declaration, Principle 2 (emphasis added).
84 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 242, ¶ 29
(July 8).
85 See Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 101 (April 20).
86 I.C.J. Reports, 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain)
(1962–1970), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1970.
87 BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 48 at 49.
80
81
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the Stockholm Declaration and the ICJ calls on states to avoid causing harm to other states or to areas
outside their jurisdiction, suggesting an obligation to protect the global commons.
The IMO has expressly embraced the no-harm principle in the context of pollution from
ships, while recognizing that states have a common interest to protect the general environment. The
London Convention recognizes:
that the marine environment and the living organisms which it supports are of vital
importance to humanity, and all people have an interest in assuring that it is so
managed that its quality and resources are not impaired.
And further recognizes:
that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.88
The no-harm principle is commonly recognized in—even considered a bedrock principle
of—international environmental law. The principle has been interpreted to impose an obligation on
states to avoid environmental damage to other nations and the global commons, and has been
adopted by the IMO. Further, the principle can apply to a problem like climate change, in which
harm is done to the global environment, rather than directly to another state. The principle also
obliges states to prevent harm caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control. Because the
principle is not constrained by borders, it suggests that states have an obligation to rein in any
shipping emissions over which they have some authority. For these reasons, the principle provides
a sound basis for the IMO to adopt an MBM to address GHG emissions from shipping.

6.

INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY

Intergenerational equity refers to the principle of balancing the current generation’s needs
with the duty to preserve resources for future generations. The 1946 International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling represents an early articulation of this principle in international law. The
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling referenced the interest of “nations of the world in

88

London Convention, preamble.
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safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks.”89
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration subsequently declared that “[t]o defend and improve the
human environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal for
mankind.”90
The Rio Declaration marks a shift towards the modern conception of the principle, which
places greater emphasis on the present generation’s interest in exploiting resources. Principle 3 of
the Rio Declaration affirms that “[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”91 While the principle
of intergenerational equity is not explicitly mentioned in any IMO documents identified, the London
Convention alludes to this notion by recognizing that “the capacity of the sea to assimilate wastes
and render them harmless, and its ability to regenerate natural resources, is not unlimited.”92 The
IMO has also committed to “actively working towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development and the associated” Sustainable Development Goals, and has recognized that “[t]he
Sustainable Development Goals provide a blueprint for the transition to a healthier planet . . . for
present and future generations.”93
In the climate change context, the UNFCCC calls on parties to “protect the climate system for
the benefit of present and future generations of humankind.” 94 In some countries, youth have
brought rights-based lawsuits against their national governments—on behalf of themselves as well
as future generations—alleging insufficient action on climate change.

95

The principle of

DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 20 at 88 (quoting the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling with Schedule of Whaling Regulations preamble ¶ 1, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 361).
90 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 1.
91 DUPUY & VIÑUALES, supra note 20 at 88–89 (quoting Rio Declaration, Principle 3).
92 Dumping Convention, preamble.
93 IMO, IMO and the Sustainable Development Goals, (visited Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/SustainableDevelopmentGoals.aspx.
94 UNFCCC, article 3.1
95 See, e.g., Mathur v. Ontario, 2020 ONSC 6918, CV-19-00631627 (Superior Ct. of Justice, Ontario,
2020); Supreme Court of Colombia, Apr. 4, 2018, Future Generations v. Ministry of Environment et
al., STC 4360-2018, 1101-22-03-000-2018-00318-01 [hereinafter Future Generations].
89
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intergenerational equity has been recognized by some national courts, including in Colombia,
Australia, the Philippines, Chile, and India.96
The principle of intergenerational equity creates a clear imperative to reduce greenhouse
gases, given the indisputable evidence that failure to do so will cause damage and suffering to future
generations. The principle therefore provides support to the IMO to impose emissions reductions
that are consistent with the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals.

7.

RIGHT TO LIFE AND RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE

The Right to Life is enshrined in all international human rights instruments, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights,
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, and the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man.97 The Rio Declaration also provides that “[h]uman beings are . . . entitled to a healthy
and productive life in harmony with nature.”98
The right to life has been interpreted to encompass the right to a clean environment, or at
least, an environment that does not pose a threat to one’s health. For example, the African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights found that by promoting oil development in
Ogoniland—which caused short- and long-term health impacts including increased risk of cancer—
the Nigerian government violated the right to life.99 In a report on pollution in Ecuador, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights similarly explained that “[t]he realization of the right to
life, and to physical security and integrity is necessarily related to and in some ways dependent upon

See Future Generations, supra note 95; SVITLANA KRAVCHENKO, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 69–70, 590 (Carolina Academic Press 2008).
97 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”]; Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1990, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International
Conference of American States (1948); see also KRAVCHENKO, supra note 96 at 23.
98 Rio Declaration, Principle 1.
99 See generally Social and Economic Rights Action Center v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, Case No. ACHPR/Comm/A044/1, Decision Regarding Comm. No. 155/96
(2001).
96
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one’s physical environment. Accordingly, where environmental contamination and degradation
pose a persistent threat to human life and health, the foregoing rights are implicated.”100
The right to family life is located in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
and has been interpreted to include a right to be free from pollution in one’s home.101 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights similarly provides that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State,” and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, [or] home.”102 In López Ostra v. Spain, interpreting the European
Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights held that “severe
environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their
homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without, however, seriously
endangering their health.”103
While we did not identify any IMO documents citing the right to life or right to family life,
they are among the bedrock human rights recognized in international law, and the IMO has made a
firm commitment to defending human rights in general.104
National and multinational tribunals have specifically recognized that climate change can
implicate the right to life and the right to family life. In Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands,
the Supreme Court of the Netherlands concluded that the Dutch Government’s GHG emissions
target was so inadequate that it threatened both the right to life and the right to family life, reasoning
that “there is the threat of dangerous climate change and it is clear that measures are urgently

Inter-Am.C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, OEA/Serv.L./V/II.96, doc. 10
rev. 1 (1997).
101 López Ostra v. Spain, Application No. 16798/90, Series A no. 303-C, (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 277,
Judgment of 9 December 1994 [hereinafter “López Ostra”].
102 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 16(3).
103 See López Ostra, ¶ 51.
104 See, e.g., IMO, Message from Kitack Lim, Secretary-General, International Maritime
Organization (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/45Human-Rights-Day.aspx; OHCHR, UNHCR, IOM, UNODC and IMO Joint Statement on
Protection at Sea in the Twenty-First Century (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15411&LangID=E.
100
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needed.”105 The same year, the Administrative Court of Berlin concluded that Germany’s climate
policies must be consistent with the government’s duty to protect fundamental rights provided by
the German Constitution, including the right to life.106 In 2020 the UN Human Rights Committee
found that climate change impacts—such as sea level rise—could become so severe as to violate the
right to life.107
The right to life and the right to family life are therefore relevant to the IMO’s authority to
adopt an MBM in at least two ways. Protecting those rights requires emissions reductions consistent
with the Paris Agreement temperature goals; and vindicating both rights requires allocating at least
some of the revenue generated from an MBM to small-island nations whose survival is threatened
by climate change.

8.

IMPACTS ON LDCS AND SIDS

That any measures to address GHG emissions should not have a disproportionately adverse
effect on least developed countries (LDC) and SIDs is a principle articulated in many multilateral
environmental agreements. Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration, for example, notes that “[t]he special
situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most
environmentally vulnerable shall be given special priority.”108
A range of IMO instruments articulate the Organization’s own commitment to considering
the specific impacts any proposed GHG reduction measure will have on LDCs and SIDS. Most
saliently, the IMO’s Initial Strategy resolution states that “[t]he impacts on States of a measure
should be assessed and taken into account as appropriate before adoption of the measure. Particular

HR. 20 Dec. 2019, NJ 19/00135 (Urgenda Foundation v. /State of the Netherlands, 19/00135
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 2019).) (Neth.) ¶ 8.3.4.
106 Family Farmers and Greenpeace Germany v. Germany, 00271/17/R/SP (See [Admin. Ct. Berlin] 31
Oct. 2019)., VG 10 K 412.18 (Family Farmers/State of Germany) (Ger.).
107 See Human Rights Committee, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional
Protocol, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016.
No. 2728/2016; see also Hillary Aidun and & Ama Francis, U.N. Human Rights Committee Issues
Landmark Climate Migration Decision, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW CLIMATE LAW BLOG
(Jan. 21, 2020).21, 2020), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2020/01/21/landmark-u-ndecision-says-countries-may-not-turn-away-climate-migrants-in-the-future/.
108 Rio Declaration, Principle 6.
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attention should be paid to the needs of developing countries, especially small island developing
States and least developed countries.”109 Further, in its strategic plan the IMO committed to “ensure
that the views of all stakeholders are taken into account in its decision-making processes and
continue to pay particular attention to the needs of developing countries, especially small island
developing States (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs).”110
In the context of GHG reduction measures, the IMO aims to address the needs of LDCs and
SIDS by requiring an initial impact assessment to be submitted as part of any proposed measure.
The MEPC has approved specific guidelines for how an impact assessment should be conducted:
“simple, inclusive, transparent, flexible, evidence-based and measure-specific.” 111 A key goal of this
assessment is to ensure that if a specific GHG measure is adopted it will not disadvantage LDCs or
SIDS relative to other member states and should ensure that the measure does not cause adverse
economic impacts.112 Specifically, the assessments of a measure’s impacts on LDCs and SIDS should
consider:

IMO Initial GHG Strategy, supra note 43 ¶ 4.10 (explanatory parenthetical information omitted).
Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO] A. 1110 (30), Six Year Strategic Plan for 2018–2023 ¶ 3 (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyD
ocuments/A.1110(30).pdf; see also Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO] A. 1098 (29), High-Level Action Plan of
the Organization and Priorities for the 2016-2017 Biennium Action 3.4.1, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/
localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyDocuments/A.1098(29).pdf
(“Identify the emerging needs of developing States in general and the developmental needs of
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in particular.”).
111 Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm. [MEPC], Procedure for Assessing Impacts on States of Candidate
Measures, Doc. MEPC.1/Circ.885 (May 21, 2019), https://www.pmo.ir/fa/filepool2/download/
3bffde5c75819b4bca7900200733e140d60eee51ae2e2c6db1f6b35e833c3aa2 [hereinafter Impact
Assessment Procedure].
112 Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Thalis Zis, Impact assessment of a mandatory operational goal-based
short-term measure to reduce GHG emissions from ships: the LDC/SIDS case study, __ INT’L ENVTL.
AGREEMENTS __ (2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-020-09523-2.
109
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(1) geographic remoteness of and connectivity to main markets; (2) cargo value and
type; (3) transport dependency; (4) transport costs; (5) food security; (6) disaster
response; (7) cost-effectiveness; and (8) socio-economic progress and
development[.]113
IMO resolutions and multilateral treaties make it clear that any GHG measure that the IMO
ultimately adopts must be one that does not place a disproportionate burden on LDCs and SIDS.
Although impact assessment may not provide an independent basis for the IMO to act, it will
shape the type of measure the organization ultimately adopts. The results of impact assessment may
provide an argument against an inappropriate greenhouse reduction measure, and one way to
mitigate any disproportionately negative consequences a GHG reduction measure may have on
SIDS and LDCs would be to transfer a portion of any proceeds from an MBM to those states in a way
that would offset the costs a new measure imposes.

9.

NO MORE FAVORABLE TREATMENT

Last, the “no more favorable treatment clause” requires parties to the various IMO
conventions to apply those conventions to all ships that visit their ports, even if the visiting ship’s
flag state is not a party to the convention. The clause, also referred to as the “non-discrimination
principle,” appears in a range of IMO instruments including MARPOL114 and Resolution A.1119(30),

Impact Assessment Procedure, supra note 111 ¶ 8.2; see also, e.g., Marine Envtl. Prot. Comm.
[MEPC], Detailed impact assessment of the mandatory operational goal-based short-term measure
Submitted by Denmark, France and Germany, Doc. ISWG-GHG 7/2/20 (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://shipowners.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ISWG-GHG-7-2-20-Detailed-impact-assessmentof-the-mandatory-operational-goal-based-short-term-measure-Denmark-France-and-Germa....pdf.
114 MARPOL article 5(4) (“With respect to the ship of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall
apply the requirements of the present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that no more
favourable treatment is given to such ships.”).
113

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3807378

25

A Market-Based Mechanism for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping

which sets out procedures for port state control over the ships that visit them.115 In its Initial Strategy,
the MEPC described the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of no more favorable
treatment as guiding considerations for any greenhouse gas reductions measure.116
The clause exists to ensure that ships cannot gain an unfairly advantageous exemption from
convention requirements by flying a non-signatory state’s flag.117 Because IMO conventions allow
port states to inspect and detain ships that do not comply with convention requirements, the clause
should expand the overall effectiveness of an IMO measure.118 And from a point of view of a nonsignatory state it should not make any difference whether an IMO measure is imposed on it directly
or through other states’ enforcement at the other states’ ports.
The clause does not provide an independent basis for the IMO to impose a greenhouse gas
reduction measure, but instead ensures that any measure actually adopted will apply more broadly
than to signatory states alone.

Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], A. 1119 (30), Procedures for Port State Control, 2019 (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/IIIS/Documents/A%2031-Res.1138%20%20PROCEDURES%20FOR%20PORT%20STATE%20CONTROL,%202019.pdf; see also Convention
on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 article X(5), July 7,
1978, 1361 U.N.T.S. 2 (“This Article shall be applied as may be necessary to ensure that no more
favourable treatment is given to ships entitled to fly the flag of a non-Party than is given to ships
entitled to fly the flag of a Party.”); International Convention for the Control and Management of
Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 142 (“With respect to ships of nonParties to this Convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of this Convention as may be
necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to such ships.”).
116 See IMO Initial GHG Strategy, supra note 43 ¶ 3.2.1.1.
117 See generally Katharina Reiling, The Emergence of Maritime Governance in the Post-War World, in
SHIPPING AND GLOBALIZATION IN THE POST-WAR ERA (Niels P. Petersson et al., eds. 2019).
118 See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Submission by the International Maritime Organization to UNFCCC
COP 15 ¶ 16 (Dec. 7, 2009), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/067.pdf (“IMO’s most
important conventions contain provisions to allow ships to be inspected through port State control,
to ensure that they meet IMO requirements.”). In the same position statement IMO noted that
“[t]here is no precedent in any of the fifty-one IMO international treaty instruments currently in
existence where measures are applied selectively to ships according to their flag . . . [and] when
IMO successfully dealt with [ozone depletion and transboundary pollution] at the request of the
international community, the principle of a differentiated approach (according to flag) was not
taken on board.” Id. at ¶ 25.
115
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CONCLUSION
In this paper we do not address whether IMO ought to act—and quickly—to address GHG
emissions from shipping because there is no serious dispute that it must; the only open questions
are around what exact measure the IMO will adopt and how it will justify that action. The polluter
pays principle provides the strongest authority for the IMO to adopt a MBM on GHGs, as it is a clear
foundation for the IMO to impose costs on shipping companies. Further, as noted throughout this
paper, other principles guide the way in which a measure should be designed and applied and may
provide general bases for the IMO to require GHG reductions from the shipping industry. These
include the Paris Agreement’s principle of highest ambition and principles established in
international law that address transboundary pollution, intergenerational equity, and the right to
life. Additionally, a number of principles weigh in favor of allocating at least some MBM revenue
towards SIDs and other vulnerable nations. These include intergenerational equity and the right to
life.
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